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WARNING 
ALTHOUGH EVERY EFFORT HAS GENERALLY BEEN MADE TO 
INCORPORATE SAFETY FEATURES INTO DESIGN, IT IS OFTEN 
NECESSARY TO RELY ON PROCEDURES AND TRAINING TO MITIGATE 
SITUATIONS THAT CAN PRODUCE HAZARDS. SAFETY IS, THEREFORE, 
HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON ADEQUATE TRAINING AND PROCEDURES. 
INADEOUATE TRAINING OR PROCEDURES OR FAILURE TO S T R I ~ Y  
ADHERE TO TRAINING AND PROCEDURES CAN LEAD TO SEVERE 
INJURlES OR DEATH. 
Analysis: BAB000000-01717-0200-00146 REV. 01 
I 1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the 
Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) Design Package IC, Surface Utilities 
(for a list of package 1C subsystems see section 3). This process is an integral part of the 
systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and 
construction. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety 
Analysis is not required. The risk assessnient in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios 
associated with the Design Package 1C structures/systems/components in terms of relative risk 
and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending 
and implementing mitigation control features is: 1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and 
hazards into the structure/system/component (S/S/C) design, 2) add safety devices and capabilities 
to the designs that reduce risk, 3) provide devices that detect and warn personnel of hazardous 
conditions, and 4) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of 
potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid 
accidents or correct hazardous conditions. 
The scope of this analysis is limited to the Design Package 1C structures/systems/components 
(S/S/Cs) during normal operations. Hazards occurring during maintenance and "off normal" 
operations have not been included in this analysis. 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
A QAP-2-0 evaluation was performed to determine if the Design Package 1C System Safety 
Analysis is subject to QARD requirements. The results of the evaluation are presented in a 
"Quality Activity Evaluation Engineering Specialty", Revision 0, dated June 20, 1994. 
Based on the results of the QAP-2-0 evaluation, this analysis is not considered to be important 
to radiological safety or waste isolation. 
3. METHOD 
The safetytrisk assessment methodology used in this analysis is shown in Figure 1. The result 
of the analysis is a "risk evaluation" of the scenarios identified in this analysis in accordance with 
MIL-STD-882C. Three steps are required to complete the risk evaluation. The steps are 
hazard/scenario identification, consequence assessment, and frequency assessment. The word 
"accident" as used in this analysis refers to events, breakdowns, incidents, or any other 
occurrence that may have a negative effect on personnel safety. 
In addition to the guidance provided in DOE Orders, traditional methods of the System Safety 
Analysis were reviewed and adopted for this analysis, including those sources listed in sections 
4 and 7. 
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Figure 1. Risk Methodology Conceptual Overview 
The S/S/C design items included in the ESF Design Package 1C safety analysis are: 
Substation w/Standby Generators 
Surface Compressed Aim 
The Design Package 1C System Safety Analysis consists of accidents caused by both ineinsic 
(e.g., human error, equipment failure) and extrinsic (e.g., act of nature, airplane crash) surface 
occurrences. Each of the scenarios contained in Attachment A of this System Safety Analysis 
has a scenario number which uniquely identifies the scenario. The scenario number not only 
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uniquely identifies the scenario, it also provides information concerning the type of scenario, i.e., 
surface or subsurface, extrinsic or intrinsic. The format of the scenario number is: 
where 1 = S or U and 2 = I or E. 
3.1 Scenario Identification 
The First step involves the identification of possible accident scenarios that can have negative 
consequences for the ESF personnel or facilities. It is important to provide assurance that 
potentially significant scenarios have been considered and the consequences are appropriately 
mitigated through design selection, safety design features or devices, detection and warning 
devices, andlor use of procedures and training. To identify the scenarios, the Design Package 
1C documentation was reviewed, i.e., design specifications, drawings, Determination of 
Importance Evaluations and the BFD. 
A systematic procedure has been used to identify the relevant scenarios. The identification of 
scenarios is a relatively complex task. Analogous scenarios were grouped together to determine 
if there were any significant differences among them. For example, several of the accident 
scenarios addresses rupture of the compressed air structures/systems/components. A rupture may 
be caused by an act of nature (e.g., earthquake, winds), a component failure (e.g., tank leak, 
defective valve), or human error (e.g., puncturing the tank, openinglclosing a valve at the wrong 
time). Each of these scenarios could be included in the System Safety Analysis as a separate 
scenario, a subset of the group of scenarios could be included in the analysis, or a single 
representative sample scenario could be included in the System Safety Analysis. The decision 
of whether to include one or more scenarios from a group of potential scenarios in the System 
Safety Analysis was based on largely qualitative factors such as the probability that the scenarios 
will result in a significantly different risk designation, the accident can be associated with a 
particular situation or piece of equipment, and the probability that the accident cause(s) or 
result(s) will impact the frequency or consequence rating. 
The scenarios are contained in Attachment A. Refer to the "System Safety Analysis Handbook," 
Scenario Analysis, page 3-241, for a description of scenario analysis. 
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3.2 Frequency Assessment 
Bounding frequency estimates were developed for the accident scenarios and system failures. 
The frequency rating scale contains five levels of estimated frequency. The frequency levels are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Frequency Rating Scale 
Frequency Description 
A Frequent Likely to occur frequently 
B Probable Will occur several times in the life of an SSC* 
C Occasional Likely to occur some time in the life of an SSC* 
D Remote Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an SSC* 
E Improbable So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be 
experienced 
* SSC = system/structure/component (e.g., Design Package lB, Design Package 2C) 
On September 6-8, 1994, a System Safety Working Group met to review the TBM System Safety 
Analysis and the Design Package 2C System Safety Analysis. During this review the working 
group also defined a set of frequency and consequence scales. A major objective was to define 
the scales so that they could be applied to other system safety analyses with little or no 
modifications. Also during the review, DOE stated that the following new project phases and 
schedule were being established: 
. Technical Site Suitability 
. Environmental Impact Statement 
. License Application. 
DOE further said that the Technical Site Suitability phase is synonymous with the ESF; and they 
directed System Safety to use a life expectancy of four (4) years for the Design Package 2C 
System Safety Analysis. 
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Based on the System Safety Working Group definitions and the life expectancy of the ESF, the 
frequency rating scale definitions used for this analysis are the same as the frequency rating scale 
definitions used for the TBM and Design Package 2C system safety analyses. The definitions 
are: 
Frequent - Greater than 4.5 occurrences during the life of Design Package 1C or more than 
one occurrence per year. 
Probable - Greater than 2.25 but not more than 4.5 occurrences during the life of Design 
Package 1C or one or less occurrence per year. 
Occasional - Greater than 1.0 but not more than 2.25 occurrences during the life of Design 
Package 1C or one or two occurrences during the life of Design Package 1C. 
Remote - Greater than .25 but not more than 1.0 occurrences during the life of Design 
Package 1C or the occurrence may happen once. 
Improbable - From 0 to .25 occurrences during the life of Design Package IC or very unlikely, 
probably no occurrence. 
3.3 Consequence Assessment 
The potential range of consequences, from minor health effects to injury and/or fatality, was 
determined by using a consequence rating scale. The rating scale and definitions are presented 
in Table 2. The consequence rating scale also addresses potential impacts to site characterization 
data ranging from no loss of data to an irretrievable loss of license application data. The 
determination of consequence for each scenario, like the frequency estimate, was based on 
engineering experience and judgment and historical operating data. 
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Table 2. Consequence Rating and Definition 
Consequence Level Maximum Consequence 
I Catastrophic 
I1 Critical 
111 Marginal 
IV Negligible 
Death, systedequipment loss, or severe 
environmental impact 
Severe injury or illness, major systedequipment 
or environmental damage 
Minor injury or illness, minor systedequipment 
damage, minor delay of data collection or loss of 
data 
Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or 
system damage 
The definitions for the consequence ratings are the same as the definitions established by the 
System Safety Working Group for the TBM and Design Package 2C system safety analyses. 
They are: 
Catastrophic - Death 
Critical - Permanent partial or complete disability. Injury does not allow worker to 
return to same job (e.g., loss of limb or eye). 
Marginal - Nonpermanent, recoverable injury that would not preclude performing the 
same job (e.g., broken bones). 
Negligible - First aid injury with no loss of work time. 
3.4 Risk Assessment 
Risk is a function of frequency and consequence. The level of risk is determined by assigning 
a qualitative rating - high, medium, low, extremely low - to each of the frequency and 
consequence combinations. By determining each scenario's frequency of occurrence and level 
of consequence, the scenario's risk classification is determined by using the risk matrix in Figure 
2. Within each risk category there is a precedence, based on consequence and frequency. For 
example, a scenario with a frequency = A and a consequence = I has a higher risk than a 
scenario with a frequency = A and a consequence = 11. 
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Since the levels of risk are largely subjective, the risk designations must be viewed as relative. 
Relative risks are useful for determining the order in which risks are addressed; they are not 
absolute measures. Absolute risk is used when sufficient historical operating data is available 
on the same design as is currently being utilized and under the same operating conditions. 
None-the-less, relative risk can be used as a management tool, especially when mitigation 
features have not been established andlor verified. 
3.5 Exclusions 
The followi~~g systems, structures, and components; processes; activities; and functions were not 
considered in this analysis: 
Conduits and piping (except for above ground piping directly associated with the 
compressed air system); 
Pipe hangers and supports; 
Equipment mounting and anchors; 
Lamps and lights; 
Surface lightning protection system; 
Maintenance procedures; 
Industrial hygiene exposure; and 
Emergency response/contingencies and off-normal operations. 
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I I I 111 IV 
CONSEQUENCE LEVELS 
High* 
Extremely Low* 
* DOE is l s b l e  for clefhian the crlteda for risk ac-tv 
Figure 2. Risk Rating Matrix 
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Maintenance procedures; 
Industrial hygiene exposure; and 
Emergency response/contingeacies and off-normal operations. 
In addition, this system safety analysis does not include determining hazards associated with 
construction, maintenance, maintenance facilities, training, testing, and support operations. 
4. CODES AND STANDARDS 
4.1 MIL-STD-882C; "System Safety Program Requirements," 19 January 1993 
4.2 DOE Order 5481.18; "Safety Analysis and Review System," 23 September 1986 
4.3 SYSTEM SAFETY HANDBOOK-A source book for safety practitioners, July 
1993, published by the System Safety Society. 
5. CRITERIA 
6. ASSUMPTIONS 
. The DOE CMO is responsible for determining whether the identified hazards 
associated with Design Package IC have been adequately mitigated to proceed with 
construction and operations of the S/S/Cs. 
. It is the designer's, i.e., M&O's, responsibility to implement the design based 
mitigation features, and it is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to verify 
and document that the hazards identified in this report have been mitigated. 
The information, i.e., Analysis and Conclusions, contained in this System Safety 
Analysis is limited to only the scenarios identified. 
Future design changes will need to be evaluated for risk to personnel. 
It is the constructor's and operator's responsibility to ensure that all procedures, 
training, manuals, and other documentation identified as mitigation features are 
complete, comprehensive, and accurate. 
7. REFERENCES 
7.1 "Summary of Work Package lC, Specification Section 01013" 
7.2 DOE Order 6430.1A, "General Design Criteria," 6 April 1989 
7.3 Minutes of the Design Package 2C System Safety Analysis Review, 8 September 
1994 
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7.4 YMP/CM-0019, "Exploratory Studies Facility Design Requirements," 19 January 
1995 
7.5 YMP/91-37, "Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Yucca Mountain Project 
Exploratory Studies Facility and Site Characterization Program" 
8. COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
Computer programs were not used in conjunction with this analysis. 
9. RESULTS 
Based on the results of the analysis, existing Preliminary Safety Analysis Report scenarios were 
modified and the need for new scenarios was identified. Table 3 identifies the scenarios 
contained in Attachment A. Each scenario was assigned to a risk category based on the 
consequcnce and the frequency of occurrence, and the scenario identification number was plotted 
on the risk rating matrix shown in Figure 3. Table 4 lists the scenarios in rank order from high 
to low risk levels. 
Detailed scenario descriptions for the Design Package 1C S/S/Cs are contained in Attachment A. 
Based on the frequency and consequence ratings, there were no scenatios with a high or medium 
risk designation, nine (10) scenarios with a low risk designation, and three (3) scenarios with an 
extremely low risk designation. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
The Design Package 1C System Safety Analysis has identified hazards related to the design of 
thc ESF Design Package 1C; the consequences of the hazards have been analyzed; an assessment 
of the risk(s) has been performed; and mitigation measures to eliminate or control hazards by 
design or operational controls have been identified. Information concerning the design was 
obtained from the Design Package IC 90% review documentation. 
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Table 3. List of Scenarios Evaluated 
Scenario 
ID Number Description 
Failure of 4160 Volt switchgear (non-emergency) for air compressors 
results in loss of non-emergency equipment power 
Failure of 12.47 KV cables (non-emergency) results in power loss to 
non-emergency system 
Failure of generator(s) causes a loss of power to facility. A potential 
effect of a generator failure(s) is a delay of tunneling operations due to 
loss of power to electric powered systems (e.g., lighting, ventilation, 
trolley) 
Failure of 4160 Volt switchgear (emergency) results in loss of 
emergency power to facility 
Failure of 4160 Volt cables (emergency) results in loss of one or more 
generators for emergency power 
Compressor explosion results in flying object(s) 
F i e  and subsequent oil explosion at compressed air plant 
Pipe rupture caused by collision results in flying rocks, dust or object(s) 
Compressed air accident causes personnel injury 
Compressed gas tank rupture results in flying object(s) 
Compressed air line rupture at portal caused by overpressure or impact 
causes loss of air pressure in ramps and drifts 
Generator(s) fire and subsequent explosion 
Compressed air line rupture at portal caused by overpressure or impact 
causes loss of air pressure in refuge chamber(s) 
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CONSEQUENCE LEVELS 
Figure 3. Scenarios Distributed Over Risk Matrix 
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Table 4. Highest Risk Contributors (page 1 of 2) 
Risk Frequency 
Level Consequence 
Scenario 
ID Number 
Low E,I 
Low E,I 
Low E.1 
Low E,II 
Low E,n 
Low E,II 
Low E,n 
Low B,N 
Low B.N 
Low B,N 
Scenario 
Description 
Fire and subsequent oil explosion at compressed 
air plant 
Generator(s) fire and subsequent explosion 
Compressed air l i e  rupture at portal caused by 
overpressure or impact causes loss of air pressure 
in refuge chamber(s) 
Compressor explosion results in flying object($ 
Pipe rupture caused by collision results in flying 
rocks, dust or object(s) 
Compressed air accident causes personnel injury 
Conlpressed gas tank rupture results in flying 
object($ 
Failure of 4160 Volt switchgear (non-emergency) 
for air compressors results in loss of non- 
emergency equipment power 
Failure of 12.47 KV cables (non-emergency) 
results in power loss to non-emergency system 
Failure of generator(s) causes a loss of power to 
facility. A potential effect of a generator 
failure(s) is a delay of tunneling operations due to 
loss of power to electric powered systems (e.g., 
lighting, ventilation, trolley) 
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Table 4. Highest Risk Contributors (page 2 of 2) 
Risk Frequency Scenario Scenario 
Level Consequence ID Number Description 
Extremely 
Low D,III SIOIOO Compressed air line rupture at portal caused by 
overpressure or impact causes loss of air pressure 
in ramps and drifts 
Extremely 
Low D,N SI0040 Failure of 4160 Volt switchgear (emergency) 
results in loss of emergency power to facility 
Extremely 
Low D,IV SI0042 Failure of 4160 Volt cables (emergency) results in 
loss of one or more generators for emergency 
power 
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Attachment A 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: S10033 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad - Switchgear Building 
SCENARIO: 
Failure of 4160 Volt switchgear (non-emergency) for air compressors results in loss of 
non-emergency equipment power. 
Electrical overload 
Breaker trips/malfunctions 
Human error (e.g., worker throws breaker) 
Loss of power to switchgear (e.g., feeder cable malfunction - burned/cut) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: B - Probable 
Consequence Rating: IV - Negligible 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONICONTROL FEATURES: 
Design switchgear in accordance with applicable codes. 
Protect breakers so that they can not be inadvertently thrown (e.g., cover on breaker 
box, use high resistance switches, recess breaker switches in switch box). 
Encase cables in concrete. 
Label breakers clearly. 
Post safetylwaming signs. 
Provide safety training for all personnel. 
Establish regular test, inspection, and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
test, inspection, and maintenance records. 
I,. J 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0033 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
System Specifications 
Training Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
Codes, Standards, and Regulations 
- DOE 6430.1, General Design Criteria Manual 
- NEC NFPA 70 
- National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C-2 
- Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) 
Title I1 Design Drawings 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0035 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad 
SCENARIO: 
Failure of 12.47 KV cables (non-emergency) results in power loss to non-emergency 
system. 
Loose connection(s) 
Electrical overload 
Insulation failure (e.g., cracked, frayed) 
Cable break (e.g., cut) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: B - Probable 
Consequence Rating: IV - Negligible 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONlCONTROL FEATURES: 
Use UL listed cables and comply with ICEA for this installation. 
Encase all medium voltage cables in concrete. 
Provide access points (e.g., covers) for inspection and repair. 
Provide backup generators for the main power system and an UPS for the critical data. 
(The likelihood of complete loss of all electrical facilities is estimated to be extremely 
low. There are standby generators and the probability of all standby generators not 
starting is rare.) 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0035 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
Title I1 Design Drawings 
Maintenance Manuals 
Codes, Standards, and Regulations 
- DOE 6430.1, General Design Criteria Manual. 
- NEC NFPA 70 
- National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C-2 
- Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0039 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad 
SCENARIO: 
Failure of generator(s) causes a loss of power to facility. A potential effect of a generator 
failure(s) is a delay of tunneling operations due to loss of power to electric powered 
systems (e.g., lighting, ventilation, trolley). 
SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Electrical overload 
Internal component failure (e.g., generator windings, brushes) 
Human error 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: B - Probable 
Consequence Rating: IV - Negligible 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATION/CONTROL FEATURES: 
Design switchgear in accordance with applicable codes. 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
F'rovide an UPS for the critical data and safety systcmns. (The likelihood of complete 
loss of all standby generators, all standby generators not starting, and the loss of all 
power at the same time is extremely low.) 
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SCENARIO NUMBER : SI0039 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
Maintenance Manuals 
Operators Manuals (e.g., emergency backup procedures) 
Codes, Standards, and Regulations 
- DOE 6430.1, General Design Criteria Manual 
- NEC NFPA 70 
- National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C-2 
- Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0040 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1119195 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad - Switchgear Building 
SCENARIO: 
Failure of 4160 Volt switchgear (emergency) results in loss of emergency power to 
facility. 
SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
+ Electrical overload 
Breaker trips/malfunctions 
Human error (e.g., worker throws breaker) 
Loss of power to switchgear (e.g., feeder cable malfunction - burned/cut) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: C - Occasional 
Consequence Rating: IV- Negligible 
Risk Designation: Extremely Low 
MITIGATIONICONTROL FEATURES: 
Design switchgear in accordance with applicable codes. 
Protect breakers so that they can not be inadvertently thrown (e.g., cover on breaker 
box, use high resistance switches, recess breaker switches in switch box). 
Encase cables in concrete. 
Label breakers clearly. 
Post safety/waming signs. 
Provide safety training for aU personnel. 
Establish regular test, inspection, and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
test, inspection, and maintenance records. 
Provide an UPS for the critical data. (The likelihood of complete loss of all elechical 
facilities is estimated to be extremely low. There are standby generators and the 
probability of all standby generators not starting is rare.) 
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SCENARIO NUMBER : SI0040 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
System Specifications 
Training Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
Codes, Standards, and Regulations 
- DOE 6430.1, General Design Criteria Manual 
- NEC NFPA 70 
- National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI C-2 
- Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) 
Title I1 Design Drawings 
Analysis: BAB000000-01717-0200-00146 REV. 01 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0042 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad 
SCENARIO: 
Failure of 4160 Volt cables (emergency) results in loss of one or more generators for 
emergency power. 
SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Loose connections 
Electrical overload 
Insulation failure (e.g., cracked, frayed) 
Failure of facility main power cables 
Cable break (e.g., cut) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: C - Occasional 
Consequence Rating: IV - Negligible 
Risk Designation: Extremely Low 
MITIGATION/CONTROL FEATURES: 
Use UL listed cables and comply with ICEA for this installation. 
Encase all medium voltage cables in concrete. 
Provide access points (e.g., covers) for inspection and repair. 
Provide an UPS for the critical data. (The likelihood of complete loss of all standby 
generator cables or the probability of all standby generators not starting is extremely 
low.) 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER : S10042 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
Title 11 Design Drawings 
Maintenance Manuals 
Codes, Standards, and Regulations 
- DOE 6430.1, General Design Criteria Manual. 
- NEC NFPA 70 
- National Elecwical Safety Code, ANSI C-2 
- Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. (UL) 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: S10078 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad - Conlpressed Air Plant 
SCENARIO: 
Conlpressor explosion results in flying object(s). 
SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Pressure relief failureblockage 
Elecaical overload 
Internal component failure (e.g.. motor, valves) 
Piping system failure (e.g., rupture) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I1 - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONICONTROL FEATURES: 
Use rotary screw type compressors. 
Incorporate protective measures in the compressed air system such as: 
- Air pressure relief valves 
- Air discharge check valve 
- High air temperature shutdown feature 
- High winding temperature shutdown (main motor) 
- Over current protection (motor & starter) 
- High temperature warning indicator 
- High pressure warning indicator(s). 
Post safetylwarning signs. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0078 
* Provide safety training for all personnel. 
Establish regular test, monitoring, inspection, and maintenance procedures and 
schedule. Maintain test, monitoring, inspection and maintenance records. 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
* Training Manuals 
* Maintenance Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
* Title I1 Design Drawings 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29024, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 1 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29025, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 2 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29026, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 3 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29027, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 4 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29028, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 5 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29029, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 6 
System Specifications 
- Specifications for compressed air systems (Sections 15481, 15482, and 15483) 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0079 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad - Compressed Air Plant 
SCENARIO: 
Fire and subsequent oil explosion at compressed air plant. 
SYSTEM/COMYONENT FAILURE: 
Air compressor malfunction 
Inlet air filter blockage 
Electrical overload 
Feeder cable malfunction (e.g., burned, cut) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I - Catastrophic 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONlCONTROL FEATURES: 
Incorporate protective measures in air compressors such as: 
- High temperature warning indicator 
- High air temperature shutdown feature 
- Over current protection 
- Air filter pressure drop warning indicator. 
Post safetylwarning signs. 
Encase cables in concrete. 
Provide safety training for all personnel. 
Removelstore flammable materials in approved containers/facilities. 
Establish regular monitoring, inspection, and maintenance procedures and schedule. 
Maintain monitoring, inspection, and maintenance records. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0079 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
System Specifications 
Training Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
Title I1 Design Drawings 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29024, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 1 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29025, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&lD, 
Sheet 2 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29026, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 3 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29027, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 4 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29028, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 5 
- BABBDF000-01717-2100-29029, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&D, 
Sheet 6 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOOSO REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad - Compressed Air Plant 
SCENARIO: 
Pipe rupture caused by collision results in flying rocks, dust or object(s). 
SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Pipe and pipe fittings 
Vehicle failure (e.g., brakes) 
Human error (e.g., failure to obey speed limit) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I1 - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATION/CONTROL FEATURES: 
Design to ANSI piping codes. 
Locate the compressor station area away from vehicular traffic. 
Protect pipes and other exposed surfaces from contact (e.g., fences, barriers, guard 
rails). 
Post safetylwaming signs. 
Provide safety training for all personnel. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: S10080 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
Safety Manuals 
* Title I1 Design Drawings 
- BABBDFOOO-0 17 17-2 100-29024, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 1 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29025, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 2 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29026, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 3 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29027, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 4 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29028, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 5 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-2100-29029, Mechanical Compressed Air System P&ID, 
Sheet 6 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0086 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
North Portal Pad - Shop Building 
SCENARIO: 
Compressed air accident causes personnel injury. 
SYSTEWCOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Compressor component failure (e.g., fittings) 
Air hoselpipe line rupture 
Air receiver tanks leaklrupture 
Human error (e.g., failure to properly tighten connections/fittings) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION A m E R  MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: 11 - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONlCONTROL FEATURES: 
Design to ANSI piping codes. 
Use only rock drill oil specifically formulated for use in compressed air in the 
compressed air lines to lubricate air operated drills/tools . 
Require all persons using, or in the vicinity of, compressed air for blowing, to wear 
safety glasses. 
Install safety chains or cables across all hose connections in accordance with MSIIA 
requirements. 
Bleed air from line@) before disconnecting or repairing compressed air line(s) or 
tool(s) connected to compressed air line($. 
Post sa€ety/warning signs. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER : SI0086 
Provide safety training for all personnel (e.g., at no time shall compressed air be 
directed toward a person, use of pneumatic power tools in accordance with 29 CFR 
1926.302). 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
29 CFR 1926, Subpart I 
30 CFR 57 
System Specifications 
Training Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
Analysis: BAU000000-01717-0200-00146 REV. 01 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOOSS REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
North Portal Pad - Shop Building 
SCENARIO: 
Compressed gas tank rupture results in flying object(s). 
SYS'I'EMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Shop oxygen arid acetylene bottles 
Valve failure 
Human Error (e.g., failure to secure bottles, failure to cap valves) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I1 - Critical 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATION/CONTROL FEATURES: 
Remove gauge and hoses from bottles and the cap valve when transporting bottles 
between surface and underground. 
Chain all bottles in place, either in storage rack, cart, etc., when the valve covers are 
removed. 
Post safetylwarning signs. 
Provide safety training for all personnel (e.g., storage, cutting, and welding operations 
in compliance with 29 CFR 1936.350). 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOOSS 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
29 CFR 1926, Subpart J 
Training Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOl00 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
North and South Portals 
SCENARIO: 
Compressed air line rupture at portal caused by overpressure or impact causes loss of air 
pressure in ramps and drifts. 
SYSTEMKOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Pipe break 
Pipe fitting failure 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: D - Remote 
Consequence Rating: I11 - Marginal 
Risk Designation: Extremely Low 
MITIGATIONICONTROL FEATURES: 
Design to ANSI piping codes. 
Use the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code stamped receivers 
with safety relief valves to alleviate overpressure. 
Position piping out of vehicle, equipment, and material travel envelope and path. 
Post safety/warning signs. 
Provide safety training for all personnel. 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOlOO 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
Safety Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Title 11 Design Drawings 
- Compressed Air Distribution System, Schematic Flow Diagram 
Design Analyses 
- BABBDFOOO-01717-0200-00023, North Portal Surface-Based Compressed Air 
System Analysis 
- BABFAGOOO-01717-0200-00161, Compressed Air Distribution Design Analysis 
Analysis: BAB000000-01717-0200-00146 REV. 01 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOlOl REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
Portal Pad 
SCENARIO: 
Gencrator(s) fire and subsequent explosion. 
.SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Internal component failure 
Fuel leak 
Fuel spill 
Human error (e.g., smoking in no smoking area) 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AFTER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I - Catastrophic 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONICONTROL FEATURES: 
Incorporate protective measures in generators such as: 
- High temperature warning indicator 
- High air temperature shutdown feature 
- Highjlow pressure warning indicators. 
Post safety/warning signs. 
Provide safety training for all personnel. 
Remove/store flammable materials in approved containers/facilities. 
Establish regular monitoring, inspection, and maintenance procedures and schedule. 
Maintain monitoring, inspection, and maintenance records. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SIOlOl 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
System Specifications 
Training Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Safety Manuals 
Title I1 Design Drawings 
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SCENARIO NUMBER: SI0121 REVISION: 01 REVISION DATE: 1/19/95 
LOCATION: 
North and South Portals 
SCENARIO: 
Compressed air line rupture at portal caused by overpressure or impact causes loss of air 
pressure in refuge chamber(s). 
SYSTEMICOMPONENT FAILURE: 
Pipe break 
Pipe fitting failure 
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AITER MITIGATION: 
Frequency Rating: E - Improbable 
Consequence Rating: I - Catastrophic 
Risk Designation: Low 
MITIGATIONlCONTROL FEATURES: 
Design to ANSI piping codes. 
Use the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code stamped receivers 
with safety relief valves to alleviate overpressure. 
Position piping out of vehicle, equipment, and material travel envelope and path. 
Require personnel to wear self-rescuers while underground (self-rescuers do not supply 
oxygen). 
Establish exact location of each refuge chamber on a surface map and provide a 
cement pad on the surface directly above each refuge chamber. The cement pad will 
provide a landmark and a stable surface so that emergency drill equipment can be 
brought onto the pad and an emergency air hole can be drilled as quickly as possible. 
Post safetylwaming signs. 
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SCENARIO NUMBER: SIO121 
Provide safety training for all personnel. 
Establish regular inspection and maintenance procedures and schedule. Maintain 
inspection and maintenance records. 
MITIGATION DOCUMENTATION: 
Safety Manuals 
Maintenance Manuals 
Title I1 Design Drawings 
- Compressed Air Distribution System, Schematic Flow Diagram 
Design Analyses 
- BABBDF000-01717-0200-00023, North Portal Surface-Based Compressed Air 
System Analysis 
- BABFAG000-01717-0200-00161, Compressed Air Distribution Design Analysis 
